Putin's Terms After Donbas: Ultimatum, Odessa, and the Question of Kiev

Central Investigation Question

What terms will Russia impose once the Battle of Donbas ends, and why do the hosts expect an ultimatum rather than an offer?

No Stalemate After the Ceasefire

When the three-day Victory Day ceasefire ended, Alex Christoforou and Alexander Mercouris returned to the judgment they have held for months: this war is not stuck. Christoforou opens with the interception rates: Ukraine's air defenses, he says, are badly depleted — something even Ukraine now acknowledges.

That reading has now reached the mainstream press. A May 13 Financial Times report, citing two people it says have knowledge of Putin's views, says Russian commanders have convinced Putin that his forces could seize the whole of Donbas by autumn, and discusses further demands that could include Kiev and Odessa. For the hosts, this is confirmation rather than news. Donbas, Christoforou says, is the main battle — and once it is concluded, Russia and Putin will come out with new terms to the West.

An Asymmetric Air War

Mercouris starts with Ukraine's drone campaign into Russia, which he concedes has been an embarrassment for Putin: the head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, a man called Afzalov, has reportedly been sacked, and the word is that this was about the Tuapse affair. But repeating a point the hosts have made many times, he insists the strikes will not change the war: damaging as they can be, they are not going to change the direction of the war, affect the Russian economy, or cause a political crisis in Russia. He goes further and calls the operation a misuse of resources: Ukraine and the CIA — which he says is basically running the operation — are expending resources on an air offensive that achieves very little, resources that might have been better spent on drone defenses for the front lines.

The Russian attacks on Ukraine, by contrast, are in his description on a far bigger scale, far more powerful and far more organized, using many types of sophisticated drones — some controlled by air controllers back in Moscow, others jet-powered, some carrying interceptors, some bombs. Hundreds of drones now arrive every night, and in daylight too, and across much of Ukraine, he says, air defenses no longer exist. The squeeze shows up behind the front lines as well: he cites information about fuel shortages for the military on the front lines, and reports that the personnel crisis is now worse than it has ever been.

The Recruitment Crisis Turns Violent

Mercouris pairs the air war with the home front, drawing on an article he was reading in Responsible Statecraft. Ukraine's recruitment crisis, now about two years old, has moved from seizing men in the streets and bundling them into vans to, he says, the most ruthless and extreme levels yet — with counter-violence spreading: shooting incidents against recruiters, and boys attacking recruiters with knives. Responsible Statecraft, in a May 13 report, documented men being snatched from streets and homes by sometimes masked men and dragged into minivans, along with shooting incidents and knife attacks by teenagers against recruitment officers.

The same article, he notes, made a broader observation about the war's information cycles: throughout the war, the West has had brief periods of euphoria — Ukraine is winning, the front lines are stabilizing, there is a stalemate, the Russians are stalled — and the latest such wave is now coming to an end.

Donbas by the End of the Year

On the front itself, Mercouris says, there is no stalemate. After the brief Victory Day ceasefire ended, the Russians are very much on the attack — apparently on the brink of breaking through in Zaporozhye towards Orekhov, the key town before the city of Zaporozhye itself, with Ukrainian defenses in Konstantinovka gradually collapsing and Sloviansk getting worse and worse. It is clear, he says, despite all the denials and pretenses, that the Battle of Donbas is coming to an end.

Asked whether Russia can complete the Donbas operation by autumn, or by the end of 2026, he does not hesitate: it sounds perfectly reasonable, based on what is happening on the front lines at the moment. The mechanism is acceleration. The more cities fall, the faster and easier it becomes to capture the remaining ones — after Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka is taking rather less time, and once it falls, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka begin to look isolated as supply lines become more difficult, until it starts to become like a row of dominoes. Russian offensives, he says, follow a seasonal pattern — starting gradually in April and May, building momentum, accelerating rapidly through the summer, with places falling in late summer and early autumn, as in 2024 and 2025. What is left to fall is the key remaining cities of Donbas, because in Donbas there is nothing else — and for a date, he is deliberately conservative: autumn, well, "let's say the end of the year to be more conservative."

Terms, Ultimatum, and the Kiev Question

The Financial Times article spoke about Kiev and Odessa — that Putin is going to actually demand Kiev itself, even more important to him than Odessa. Mercouris relays that framing without endorsing it: he does not himself think that is what Putin is going to do. His own list of terms starts with territory and alliances: Ukraine must withdraw from Zaporozhye and Kherson and from other areas of that kind, perhaps along the border, and must finally commit not to join NATO — and, he thinks, not to join the EU. The big demand, in his view, is political: a complete reconstruction of Ukraine's political system, with the time having come, he suggests, to move towards federalization.

And it reaches the top of the state. Zelensky himself and the elite around him will have to step down — Russia has said many times it does not accept him as the legitimate leader of Ukraine — with a new interim government including people from the opposition, like Tsaryov, currently in Russia, and others from the former opposition parties now in exile there. Since none of that will be acceptable to Zelensky, what Russia tables will not really be an offer: it will be more an ultimatum, actually, and then the war will continue, followed by an operation towards Odessa.

Whether there is also an operation towards Kiev, he is less sure of — but the pieces could be argued to be being put into place. The strange operations in Sumy and the Kharkiv region begin to look like preparations for an advance on Kiev, and there have been many rumors of a build-up of logistics and transport links in Belarus, perhaps for an advance towards Kiev from Belarus, as in 2022. If it comes, it will not be a replay: not 2,000 men turning up to capture an airport with another 20,000 behind them, but an army of hundreds of thousands of battle-tested men, with far more armored vehicles and fleets of drones.

For the Ukrainian leadership, Christoforou argues, Kiev is the scarier prize. Losing Odessa would be a crisis for Ukraine; losing Kiev would be a crisis for them, because without Kiev it becomes much more difficult for them to say they are the government of Ukraine anymore — and Ukraine may realistically never get it back. The city also carries a historical charge in Russia: many people there consider Kiev not just a Russian city but the first Russian city, the city where Russia as a state and a nation began — not everyone thinks that way, he stresses, but he suspects quite a lot of people in Putin's entourage do.

The hosts close with a caveat about provenance. The Financial Times article's sources were European and, Christoforou believes, a Ukrainian source — and it was those sources, not the hosts, talking about Kiev and Odessa. The FT did say it had spoken to two people with knowledge of Putin's views, Mercouris notes, but he does not believe the Financial Times has access to people like that — at least not in Russia.

Everything in this episode — the front-line readings, the terms, the timelines — is the hosts' attributed interpretation. Whether Donbas falls by the end of the year, and whether any Russian terms arrive as an ultimatum, are predictions the coming months will test.

Interview Highlights2 exchanges

Direct dialogue & timestamps from the recording

QAlex Christoforou
09:30

Does Mercouris think Russia could complete the Donbas operation by the end of 2026?

AAlexander Mercouris

Mercouris says completing operations in the Donbas by the end of 2026 is a reasonable estimate based on current front-line developments. He argues that each captured city makes the remaining positions more isolated and their supply lines harder to sustain, creating an accelerating domino effect. He also points to the pattern of Russian offensives in 2024 and 2025: gradual movement in spring, faster advances in summer, and cities falling in late summer or early autumn. On that basis, he expects the remaining key Donbas cities to fall by autumn, or by year-end under a more conservative estimate.

QAlex Christoforou
11:41

What terms does Mercouris expect Russia to demand after the Donbas operation?

AAlexander Mercouris

Mercouris does not expect Russia to demand Kyiv itself. He expects demands for Ukrainian withdrawal from Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and possibly other border areas, firm commitments not to join NATO or the EU, and a reconstruction of Ukraine's political system through federalization. He also expects Russia to demand that Zelensky and his inner circle step down and that an interim government include opposition figures, including some now in exile in Russia. Because Zelensky is unlikely to accept those conditions, Mercouris says the proposal would function as an ultimatum and the war would continue, probably toward Odessa; he remains uncertain about a future operation against Kyiv.