The Hardest Part of Europe's Energy Predicament to Resolve Is Not Price
Introduction
Oil prices, gas reserves, diesel, and jet fuel were all placed on the same pressure gauge by the program. Alex Christoforou opened by saying that Brent crude was already approaching or exceeding $100 per barrel; Alexander Mercouris then warned that European gas reserves were running low. Alex Christoforou 00:11 “Brent crude is at 100. It may have even passed 100.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 00:11
All of these figures are time-sensitive and must be verified against market and inventory data. The real question the program raises is not the price on any given day, but rather: after Europe voluntarily restricted one energy source, why does it still keep expanding the same set of policies?
After Supply Is Reduced, Competition Does Not Disappear
Mercouris's basic assessment is that after Europe reduces Russian supply, it can only turn more to the global LNG and refined product markets, competing with Asian buyers. Cargoes will flow to the markets that bid higher; they will not automatically stay because of Europe's political needs.
The program also claims that diesel and jet fuel are in short supply and that European wholesale gas prices have already risen by about 50%. Alexander Mercouris 02:54 “We have already seen a 50% rise in European wholesale gas prices.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 02:54 The individual figures have yet to be verified, but the hosts' argument is clear: restricting low-cost supply does not eliminate demand; it only shifts demand to a costlier, more competitive market.
Energy Prices Reach Every Factory
The program reports that natural gas costs in Germany rose from about $10 to between $65 and $70, using this to illustrate the price gap for alternative supply. Alex Christoforou 11:37 “They were paying around $10. Now it's gone up to around 65, $70.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 11:37 This set of specific figures needs to have its units, contract terms, and time frame confirmed, and cannot be directly treated as a uniform price for all of German industry.
But the logic of energy as a foundational input does not depend on this single figure. Chemical, steel, glass, automotive, and supply-chain companies all carry energy costs into production, investment, and site selection. The hosts therefore link the Nord Stream supply disruption to European deindustrialization and treat the pressure on companies such as Volkswagen as part of the result. Alexander Mercouris 12:51 “When they suspended the Nord Stream pipelines.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 12:51
That is the program's judgment about causality. To confirm it, one would need to observe industrial output, corporate investment, energy costs, demand changes, and other policy factors at the same time.
Why the Price Cap Did Not End Trade
The hosts criticize the EU for repeatedly lowering the price cap on Russian oil, while also claiming that Russia's oil export revenues rose 60% year on year. Alex Christoforou 05:51 “Revenue from oil exports was up 60%.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 05:51 The program provides no verifiable raw data, so the revenue change cannot be confirmed on that basis.
What it wants to convey is that the transaction chain adapts to restrictions: buyers, fleets, processing sites, and intermediaries change, and energy can still enter the market, only via a longer and less transparent path. If policy adjusts only nominal prices but cannot control global demand and alternative channels, it may increase friction costs without achieving the intended revenue compression.
The Real Predicament Is That the Policy Cannot Be Stopped
Christoforou sums up Europe's situation as "all self-inflicted." Alex Christoforou 12:21 “It's all self-inflicted.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 12:21 This is the program's most sharply stated position and also the one most likely to obscure the multiple causes at work in reality.
Mercouris further speculates that some European leaders still believe that as long as Russia is ultimately "defeated" or "broken," the losses at hand will be exchanged for future gains. Alexander Mercouris 16:43 “When we do break Russia, there'll be lots of money for us all.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 16:43 He also links policy continuity to career incentives within the EU institutions. These judgments about motives are not proven by the program and cannot be written up as a collective plan of European decision-makers.
But it raises a question that is harder than energy prices: if policy persistently deviates from its stated goals, how do institutions acknowledge the error and change direction? The causes could be misjudgment, sunk costs, alliance constraints, or political incentives—the program does not fully distinguish among them.
Europe's energy predicament is therefore not merely a more expensive bill. Prices can fall back with the market, and inventories can be replenished; what is truly difficult to reverse is the loss of capacity once industrial investment has left, and a set of policies that keeps doubling down in the absence of an error-correction mechanism.
Interview Highlights3 exchanges
Direct dialogue & timestamps from the recording
How serious is Europe's energy and oil-supply problem?
And just to add to that litany of trouble, we now have further reports, including a long article, finally, in the Financial Times, about the fact that European reserves, natural gas reserves, are extremely low this year, lower than they were in the summer of 2021, which if you remember, led to gas price hikes and and short shortages. Anyway, they're lower. and the Europeans are struggling to buy LNG um in the spot markets because Asian buyers are outbidding them by offering even higher prices. So, they're not able to fill up their gas reserves ahead of the winter. So, we have problems with oil, which you've just talked about. This is crude oil. We've got problems with refined oils. There is a worldwide shortage of diesel oil and diesel oil prices are rising and it's made worse by the fact that the Russians are not exporting diesel at this time. There are shortages of aviation fuel which could affect eventually airline tickets and all of those things. And we have already seen a 50% rise in wholesale prices for natural gas in the EU with a real possibility that they could go much further, much higher in the autumn. This all looks extremely difficult. And the amazing thing is that European governments are completely oblivious to this. Not just European governments, but the American government to some extent as well. Instead of planning and working to deal with this problem, they're most mostly focused, as you absolutely rightly say, on sanctions against Russia, on reducing the oil price cap to $44 a barrel for Russian oil, $44 against an price of $100 a barrel. I mean, it it it is ridiculous. Bearing in mind that the Europeans themselves uh from the 1st of January are not supposed to be buying Russian oil. [laughter] So, they're trying to enforce a global price of $44 a barrel on third-party buyers. I mean, it is nonsense. But, I mean, the mere act of doing that is going to create complications in the world managed maritime industry and in the global oil markets. And to add folly upon folly, Kaja Kallas, having got $44 a barrel price cap, now wants to use EU navies to start intercepting shadow fleet tankers, Russian shadow fleet tankers, as she calls them, in the Indian Ocean. So, ships carrying oil at [snorts] higher prices to Indian refineries, and the Indians, by the way, are now buying Russian oil at um you know, um the highest quantities ever. All the oil refineries in India are now busy importing Russian oil, refining it, re-exporting some of it to Russia, by the way, uh exporting other parts of it to the EU. But, Kaja Kallas wants to somehow interfere in this trade by seizing ships on the high seas in the Indian Ocean delivering oil to India. I mean, you you cannot make this up. You couldn't make this up. It is actually, however, really happening. [laughter]
Why does the EU keep imposing new sanctions when the earlier packages have not produced results?
are you telling me that throughout the entire European Union and the EU ambassadors and and the and the different member states and the foreign ministers of the member states and the staffs of the foreign ministers of the member states and the advisors and the think tanks, there's not one person to say, "Hold on a minute, guys. We've gone through 21 of these. There's a global energy shortage. Hormuz is closed. Al-Mandab Strait is is is most likely going to be blockaded if not already blockaded. We're the customer. We're the buyer. We're not the supplier. There's no way that we're going to be able to to dictate the price of oil with this price cap. And and there is zero doubt that Russia is going to find a gazillion buyers of oil at at whatever price is out there in the market. So, let's just stop this. There's no one There's no one to to say this?
Are European governments deliberately pushing their own economies toward deindustrialization?
A lot of people ask this question. And there are a lot of people out there who think this that this is all a deliberate thing to somehow crash the European economies, to create some kind of and the Western economies and create create a wave of chaos, which these people believe they can ride. And what the point I've always made is if that if they really believe that, then they're even madder than they are if they're just doing this for all the stupid reasons that we've said. Because um you can't ever ride a wave of chaos in that way. To be honest, and I thought about this myself many times, because as I said, there does seem to be something so strange about this, so contrary to what we see usually from governments. I think that these people are just in the grip of an obsession. They started this thing back in 2022. They were absolutely convinced that Russia was a house of cards, that it would fall over almost immediately. Uh and it is impossible for them to accept after all the damage they have already done to themselves, that they are wrong. So, as people who find themselves in that kind of mental trap often do, they just come back and insist on doing even more and more and more, continuing to tell themselves that Russia is a house of cards. And if you just put a little bit more pressure, if you start seizing tankers in the Indian Ocean, if you, you know, start imposing price caps of $44 when oil prices are $100 a barrel and rising, that somehow is going to be the silver bullet that is going to kill Russia, defeat Russia, [snorts] uh prove that what we were saying, that it was a house of cards, all along was true, and justify all of the terrible destruction and havoc in the European economies that we have already seen. And of course, the