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The Strait Closes Again: Iran's Deal Camp, the FT's Russia Timeline and the Ghost of Raisi

Long Read·8 min read·9 sections
Raisi's BRICS Legacy Shapes Iran's Future as War Resumes
The DuranRaisi's BRICS Legacy Shapes Iran's Future as War Resumes
23:00 · 2026-09-06Listen
Contents 9 sections
  1. Introduction
  2. Dueling Ship Counts
  3. Two Camps in Tehran
  4. The Arrangement That Collapsed
  5. The American Frame
  6. No Path to Military Victory
  7. Hormuz Is the Key — and the Salesman in Chief
  8. The FT's Timeline and the Raisi Legacy
  9. A Minsk Deal for Tehran

Introduction

Recorded as US-Iran military operations restart, this Duran episode is organized around one chokepoint and one question: who actually controls the Strait of Hormuz? Alexander Mercouris's headline judgment — the Strait of Hormuz is completely closed again as of recording, because without Iranian complicity nothing passes — sits against Alex Christoforou's dueling ship counts, Trump's daily Truth Social posts , and a map of Tehran's factions that runs from the IRGC's confrontation camp to Pezeshkian's deal camp. Behind it all stands the ghost of Ebrahim Raisi — the president who took Iran into BRICS — and a Financial Times investigation the hosts treat as an intelligence-authored confirmation that Russia's military assistance to Iran began on his watch.

Dueling Ship Counts

Christoforou's opener sets the stakes: military operations between the United States and Iran have restarted, and both sides' strikes and retaliation are Trump posts about it just about daily on Truth Social — and the claims about what is actually getting through the strait could not differ more. The administration says , against ; the tracking services that watch the strait

Mercouris's reading cuts through the numbers: certainly some ships have been getting through — on the southern route, , the very route the administration says is being used. " and without the Iranians in some way green-lighting it." Whatever is moving is moving with a Persian green light.

Two Camps in Tehran

The episode's core is a faction map. On one side, the hardliners — — who as leverage over the Americans and whose barely concealed objective is to get the Americans to

On the other, President Masoud Pezeshkian — the politician responsible for an economy : very high inflation, budget deficits, falling incomes. He that this is the moment to end the war — , the political system intact, make the deal while strong — and what he wants is a with the Strait's reopening part of the deal. The speaker of the Iranian Parliament, , and sympathizers reach into the system's marrow: Eighteen days after this recording, Pezeshkian was still making exactly this case — telling Fox News Iran remained willing to move forward with the agreement reached with Trump .

The Arrangement That Collapsed

How did the strait close again? Mercouris reconstructs the mechanism. There was an informal arrangement: , and the Iranian side's argument was to , then and a long-term agreement with the Americans.

Then He took to Truth Social to declare that , saying things that suggested he was The result: — , , and the fighting in effect resumed. Hence the headline judgment: the strait is . "

Christoforou's pushback frames the deal camp's dilemma: the MOU — the US especially wanted nothing to do with it — "

The American Frame

Mercouris locates the deeper problem: For too many in Iran's policy machinery the question reduces to whether you can achieve peace with the Americans to rebuild the economy, or must fight them and And prepared to think of alternatives —

The counterexample is the previous president, Ebrahim Raisi: , with close relations with the Chinese and the Russians, and growing information shows during his time. Then he — and in his absence the entire discussion reverted, as if by default, to the American question. "

No Path to Military Victory

On the hardliners' own terms, can Iran win? " The IRGC and Iran can — pipelines, energy facilities, desalination plants, a massive humanitarian crisis — " The hosts' own early-war prediction that a war past a week would swing the pendulum toward Iran — but an indefinite war of choice reverses it: , whose resources Iran alone cannot match. A long war of choice would be

Yet Mercouris concedes the hardliners' premise: and cannot make long-term deals with them. Which is his bridge: Iran has — and the Iranians don't seem interested, with Pezeshkian focused on the Americans

Hormuz Is the Key — and the Salesman in Chief

Christoforou supplies the economic engine of the whole war: " If the US can get ships through — exert some control over — then and the wider risk stay low: the things that would otherwise lead to American retreat and defeat all hang on getting ships through,

Hence the salesman: " — only one may be crossing, he says forty, and parts of the public, the financial institutions and the market will believe him, so and everything stays moderated — Iran's mirror-image logic: on the US and the global economy until America retreats. "

Mercouris's rejoinder turns the key over: the is to play a different game altogether — because Hormuz's leverage

The FT's Timeline and the Raisi Legacy

Then the episode's evidentiary centerpiece: " Mercouris can tell the difference between an article and one based on real information — and this one confirms what both hosts have privately heard: and all kinds of military assistance to build up Iran's defenses. " The FT's reporting bears the hosts' reading out: programme C430L, Russian engineers advising on a supersonic cruise missile, described as one of the most significant known transfers of strategic military technology from Moscow to Tehran .

And the timeline: The conclusion is delivered flat — " The FT dates the programme to 2023, with the contract signed in November 2023 — squarely inside Raisi's term . On air the connection becomes legacy: because of Raisi's connections ; other connections mean China and other BRICS states ; probably because of his role Iran and its drones. But Iran is — back inside the false choice of a US deal or indefinite war. "

A Minsk Deal for Tehran

Christoforou's closing ask: — a deal with the United States made , which buys the time to build up for the conflict both sides know is coming In a way, — was about giving Ukraine time to build its military, while the Russian counter-argument holds was time to prepare the economy for the sanctions that eventually hit.

Mercouris's verdict: " But — and right now the Russians and So the prescription: and explaining — we know any deal with the Americans won't be honored; five years is too long; "; we need time and help — do we have your support? The quiet-contacts version already exists — Pezeshkian , met Xi Jinping and Putin — but , in a constant flow from Tehran — cabinet, and "

Interview Highlights

4 exchanges
  • Q

    Who really controls the Strait of Hormuz — and why did the fighting restart?

    Alex Christoforou asked00:00
    A
    Alexander Mercouris answered

    Some ships have been getting through — but Mercouris cannot imagine that happening without the Iranians knowing and in some way green-lighting it. Iran's factions: the hardliners, concentrated in the IRGC, want confrontation, want the Strait kept completely closed as leverage, and hardly conceal their objective of pushing the Americans out of the Persian Gulf entirely. Pezeshkian, the president, owns the economy — very high inflation, budget deficits, falling incomes — and has just said this is a good moment to end the war: Iran is ahead on points, the political system is intact, make the deal while strong. He wants a return to something like the MOU, and parliamentary speaker Ghalibaf shares the view; sympathizers exist even in the military and possibly within the IRGC. Hence the informal arrangement — the Omanis letting ships through on the southern route, Iranians looking the other way — until Trump could not restrain himself, posted that the United States controls the Strait and signaled no mood for compromise. The arrangement fell apart, hardliners in Tehran regained the ascendancy, ships in the Strait were struck, the fighting in effect resumed — and as of this recording the Strait of Hormuz is completely closed again: without some degree of Iranian complicity, no ship can pass. It is as simple as that.

  • Q

    Why can't Iran's leadership see any option that isn't the United States?

    Alex Christoforou asked06:44
    A
    Alexander Mercouris answered

    The fundamental problem is that the entire discussion is exclusively centered on the United States — for far too many people in the Iranian policy-making machinery it reduces to whether you can achieve peace with the Americans so you can rebuild the economy, or whether you have to fight them and accept decades of hardship until you win. Relatively few people in the upper reaches of Iran's political system are prepared to think of alternatives: developing BRICS, strengthening relations with China, building stronger relations with Russia. The previous president, Ebrahim Raisi, did think in those ways — he brought Iran into BRICS, had close relations with the Chinese and the Russians, and growing information shows military contacts between the Russians and the Iranians began to grow and even burgeon during his time. Then he died in a helicopter accident, the nature of which has never been fully clarified — and in his absence, unfortunately, the entire discussion within Iran has reverted, as if by default, back to whether or not to make a deal with the Americans, nobody looking for alternatives instead.

  • Q

    Does Iran have a path to a military victory over the United States?

    Alex Christoforou asked10:15
    A
    Alexander Mercouris answered

    Ultimately, probably not. The IRGC and Iran can wreak devastation across the Middle East — destroy all the pipelines, the energy facilities, the desalination plants, create a massive humanitarian crisis — but the United States is a superpower and Iran is not. In a war of that kind extended indefinitely, the pendulum of advantage gradually shifts in favor of the Americans, whose resources Iran by itself is simply unable to match. The earlier prediction — that a war lasting longer than a week would swing the pendulum toward Iran — proved right, but an indefinite war of choice reverses it. There are uncertainties — a US economic crisis, a policy change in Washington, exhaustion with the length of the Middle East commitment — but none of those is a plan, and a long war of choice would be very reckless. By contrast, the hardliners are absolutely right that you cannot trust the Americans and cannot make long-term deals with them — such deals will be broken and leave Iran in an enormous position of disadvantage. Which is exactly the point: Iran has other options that don't involve the United States, and the Iranians don't seem to be thinking about them or interested in taking them — Pezeshkian remains focused on the Americans to an extremely unhealthy degree.

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