What Saudi Arabia Truly Can't Afford May Not Be Defeat on the Battlefield

Introduction

A conflict with the Houthis that is once again heating up first brings to mind missiles, drones, and border security. But in Alexander Merkouris's judgment, the more dangerous problem for Saudi Arabia right now is not whether it can win a military confrontation—it's whether the war will cut off the oil exports that sustain the country's revenue.

The program compresses this risk into two waterways: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb. The former links to the Persian Gulf; the latter guards the southern end of the Red Sea. If the Persian Gulf exit is blocked, Saudi Arabia could still attempt to ship crude to the Red Sea; but once Red Sea ports, loading vessels, and southbound shipping lanes also come under attack, the alternative route itself loses its meaning. Merkouris accordingly offers the most severe projection of the entire episode: pressure could escalate from "rerouting exports" to "being unable to export at all." This is his judgment, not a fact the program has proven. Alexander Mercouris 02:07 “Saudi Arabia's entire oil export trade stops.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 02:07

Last Time It Could Drag On—This Time, Perhaps Not

The key to understanding this judgment is not comparing which of the two wars was more intense, but comparing what Saudi Arabia still had in hand when it entered each of them.

Looking back at the earlier Yemen war, Merkouris notes that although Saudi Arabia never defeated the Houthis, it was still able to keep exporting oil, so the war never severed its cash flow; the United States and other Gulf states were also providing sustained assistance at the time. In his telling, both of those conditions have now weakened: export routes face greater pressure, while external partners are tied down by the broader US–Iran conflict. He therefore believes Saudi Arabia is re-entering the conflict from a weaker position than in the previous round. Alexander Mercouris 08:40 “Saudi Arabia, it seems to me, is going into this conflict with the Houthis in a much weaker position than it was in previously.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 08:40

Onshore pipelines look like a fallback card. Christoforu mentions that Saudi Arabia claims it can continue delivering energy to Asia overland; Merkouris, for his part, believes these routes remain within striking range of Iran or the Houthis and cannot be treated as a reliable fallback route. Alexander Mercouris 06:18 “These land routes, which do exist, don't look particularly safe.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 06:18

The program thus builds a complete—though still unverified—chain of reasoning: the pressures of war bear not only on military installations, but also potentially on ports, pipelines, shipowners' choices, and national revenue. When all export directions become unstable at once, what Saudi Arabia endures is no longer just the cost of the battlefield, but the uncertainty of the very revenue needed to sustain the war.

The Hardest Thing to Explain Is Why the War Restarted

Precisely because the costs are so obvious, the program shifts the question from "what Saudi Arabia will face" to "why Saudi Arabia would do this."

Merkouris offers a specific account: an Iranian plane shuttled a Houthi delegation to and from Ali Khamenei's funeral; Saudi Arabia deemed an air corridor between Iran and the Houthis unacceptable and bombed Sana'a airport; the plane subsequently switched to another airport, and the planned trip was not stopped—yet the ceasefire collapsed as a result. The program provides no external source for this timeline, so it can only be kept as Merkouris's account of the conflict's starting point. Alexander Mercouris 08:51 “Why is it even happening at all?” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 08:51

If one accepts this account, the contradiction in decision-making becomes conspicuous: an action that failed to stop the plane from making its round trip may nonetheless have pulled Saudi Arabia back into a war harder to sustain than before. Merkouris therefore suspects that Riyadh's decision may have been subject to pressure from the United States, Israel, or other external forces. This remains speculation, not a confirmed causal relationship.

Can a Nuclear Cooperation Pledge Explain This Gamble?

Christoforu then raises whether Saudi Arabia's choice is connected to its long-sought uranium enrichment arrangement. Merkouris answers directly that he believes an exchange exists: the United States advances the relevant cooperation, while Saudi Arabia takes action on Iran and the Houthis. Alexander Mercouris 11:38 “I think there was a quid pro quo.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 11:38

He then goes on to claim that, after the action, Saudi Arabia was told that the deal's entry into force would also be conditioned on recognizing Israel. The program shows no agreement text, no official statement, and no named sources. Therefore, this part cannot be written as a confirmed deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia that was reached and then altered—it can only be accurately attributed as Merkouris's explanation.

But this unverified exchange reveals the second layer the program truly wants to discuss: if diplomatic commitments are merely provisional bargaining chips for the next round of negotiation, can a country be expected to assume real risks on the strength of a promise, only to discover later that the terms have changed? Merkouris sums up this pattern as repeatedly making commitments, getting the other side to act first, and then seeking new leverage. Alexander Mercouris 14:27 “He is constantly looking for leverage. He constantly makes promises that he doesn't intend to keep.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 14:27

Christoforu draws a further prediction from this: Trump may use Turkey's F-35 deal and the Saudi arrangement together in negotiations with Netanyahu. Merkouris, in turn, believes such a practice will ultimately anger all parties involved. Alex Christoforou 13:59 “Trump is going to leverage the Turkey F-35 deal as well as the Saudi deal.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 13:59

Two Questions, Two Kinds of Evidence

What this episode ultimately leaves behind is two questions of different natures.

The first is physical: where else can Saudi oil still be shipped out? The program presents a scenario in which straits, ports, and pipelines come under simultaneous pressure, but these judgments must be verified by data on shipping, loading, and facility operations.

The second is political: why would Saudi Arabia re-enter a conflict under unfavorable conditions? The program explains this through external pressure and a nuclear cooperation exchange, but what is presented so far remains the hosts' speculation, requiring agreement texts, official statements, or credible reporting for support.

The two threads must not be conflated. Export risk determines how large a price Saudi Arabia may pay; decision-making motives determine why it is willing to bear that price. The program raises valuable questions about both, yet offers a final answer to neither.