Why Pashinyan's Turn to the EU Reads as National Suicide
Introduction
In a short take, The Duran takes up Nikol Pashinyan's stated intention to take Armenia into the European Union — breaking from Russia and the CSTO security umbrella while shifting toward the West, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Both hosts read the pivot as a march off a cliff. Nothing said in the program has been independently verified for this article; what follows reconstructs the argument with its attribution and hedging left in place.
The Pivot and Its Supporters
The episode opens with the frame — "this is insanity from Pashinyan" — and Alexander Mercouris's first move is to complicate the easy version: whatever one thinks of him, Pashinyan in Yerevan does have support, from people linked to the NGOs and a large section of Armenian media. Mercouris adds his own doubt about the recent parliamentary elections — he doesn't think Pashinyan did nearly as well as the official figures say — a personal assertion offered without evidence, and one of several in this episode that rest on the hosts' say-so. Still, Pashinyan controls the parliament, and that is the political base making the pivot possible.
One Security Rope, Already Being Tugged
The case against the pivot runs through dependency. Pashinyan has already lost Nagorno-Karabakh, and what he is now risking is Armenia's long-term security — security which, in Mercouris's telling, has only ever been provided by Russia, a claim he dates to the late 18th century and anchors with the First World War collapse of the Russian Empire. The economic version is blunter: the reason Pashinyan has stayed in power is that life has been okay for most Armenians, and it has been okay because of good economic relations with Russia. That rope is already being tugged: the Russians are starting to place restrictions on Armenian exports, with gas supply named as a further lever. The trap at the end of that road, in Mercouris's opinion: a gas cutoff would force Armenia toward enemy Azerbaijan, certain to use the opening to demand even more concessions — Nakhchivan, land corridors, and the like. His verdict: a policy of national suicide — though he expects no change of course. Christoforou's endpoint is starker still: Armenia reduced to a type of city-state — Yerevan and its outskirts, and that is it.
No Point of Return
The second half turns on how Armenia got here. The "very sinister move," as Christoforou tells it: Pashinyan conceded publicly that Nagorno-Karabakh was Azerbaijan's, then blamed Russia, the CSTO, and Armenia — using all of it to fuel anti-Russian sentiment and justify the turn West. The promised alternatives get short shrift: Azerbaijani gas at a very heavy price, a Western-EU bailout of the economy that "we know what that means." Mercouris's rejoinder is categorical: there is no economic lifeline for Armenia from the West — that is fantasy — and no security either. Ask the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis. Ask the Ukrainians what Western guarantees are worth. The decisive fact, as he reads it: the Karabakh concession was made before the 2020 war, and from that moment Armenia was on the slide — from that point there really is no point of return. The church is appalled and in conflict with Pashinyan — he gave the Catholicos no role at the opening of parliament, an astonishing thing — and the policy will be pursued to the bitterest end, bitter for the Armenian people. The closing explanation of Pashinyan's survival is anecdotal but pointed: in many visits to Yerevan, Christoforou has met nobody who likes him — the answer, as the hosts see it, is the NGOs, the media, a US Embassy in Yerevan that is a city in itself, and big, powerful diasporas in Russia, France and the United States.
Interview Highlights
2 exchanges- Q
Why do the hosts call Pashinyan's pivot to the EU a policy of national suicide?
Alex Christoforou asked00:03AAlexander Mercouris answeredInsanity, in Mercouris's view, but typical of the kind found among a certain type of politician in the former Soviet space. Pashinyan does have support in Yerevan: people linked to the NGOs and a large section of Armenian media back this line, and although Mercouris doubts he did nearly as well as the official figures claim in the recent parliamentary elections, he still controls the parliament. He has already lost Nagorno-Karabakh, and he is now putting Armenia's long-term security — provided, in Mercouris's telling, only by Russia since the late 18th century, as the end of the First World War showed starkly — in jeopardy. More immediately he is jeopardizing the Russia-Armenia economic and trade links behind the country's decent performance of the past five to ten years, which kept life tolerable and Pashinyan in power. The Russians have begun restricting Armenian exports and hold further levers, notably gas. If gas is cut, Armenia has no alternative but its enemy Azerbaijan, which still holds territorial claims and, given its leadership, is certain to use the opening to demand further concessions over Nakhchivan and land corridors. A policy of national suicide — but Pashinyan is now too compromised and too committed to ever change course.
- Q
Did Pashinyan's Karabakh concession put Armenia past the point of return?
Alex Christoforou asked04:24AAlexander Mercouris answeredNo. In Mercouris's account there is no economic lifeline for Armenia from the West — thinking otherwise is fantasy — and no security either: look at what Western security guarantees have delivered for the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis, and the Ukrainians. Pashinyan and people like him in Yerevan are now so deeply committed that retreat is impossible. The decisive step, as Mercouris reads it, was Pashinyan's statement — made before the 2020 war — that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan: from the moment he said it, Armenia was placed on the slide, and from that point there is no return. He is now in conflict with the church, which is appalled: he gave the Catholicos no role in the opening of the Armenian parliament — an astonishing thing — and Mercouris reads him as determined to pursue the pro-Western, pro-EU policy to the bitterest end. And it will be bitter, he says, for the Armenian people.