AfD Wins Big, CDU Collapse, Merz is Finished

A host-only episode broadcast September 7, 2026, the day after the Saxony-Anhalt state election. Christoforou's opener puts the result on the table: the AfD the big winner. Mercouris's answer becomes the episode's spine: absolutely a huge victory — they outpaced even the most optimistic estimates, most polls capping them at 43% and they got almost 44, on a record turnout of over 77% — a tidal wave in regional terms, in a state he is careful to say is no economic powerhouse: around 2 million people, no enormous industries. The mirror half is a total collapse of Chancellor Merz's CDU — from about 36% in 2021 to just over 17%, the vote more than halved — in what was always its safest ground: the conservative south of the former East Germany, the party of reunification, the party of Helmut Kohl. Impossible, he says, to read as anything other than a massive repudiation of Merz, of his government in Berlin, and of the entire German political system. The structural heart of the segment is the firewall arithmetic. The AfD has been delivered what is for them the perfect result: just short of a majority — three seats short — only because the smaller parties all cleared the threshold: Die Linke (in East Germany the legacy party of the former ruling communist party), the Greens, and Sahra Wagenknecht's BSW. The AfD has much more than twice as many votes as the next biggest party, the CDU — so applying the firewall now means a broken, discredited, deeply unpopular CDU forming a government with parties identifiable with the former ruling communists: which would be seen across Germany as a grotesque establishment stitch-up, an inversion of democracy. Hence the paradox: this is almost the optimal result for the AfD. If it forms a government, the firewall has collapsed (Christoforou, flatly: the firewall is over). If it is denied, it becomes the party that was ripped off — the corrupt elite ignoring the will of the people — and gains even more support. The near-term chess: the BSW has indicated it might tolerate an AfD government, though an uncomfortable partner the AfD is unlikely to cut deals with; a drift of CDU parliamentarians to the AfD is not impossible, though they would be slated for it inside the CDU. And in Berlin the end-game: growing hostility to Merz specifically, an anti-Merz faction forming inside the CDU itself, about a fifth of Germans in polling no longer expecting him to be chancellor beyond the end of the year — against the German norm under which even the unsuccessful Scholz limped on to the election he lost — so a very high chance, Mercouris judges, of the end of Merz within the next few weeks. The second segment takes the CDU's options apart. Dumping Merz is the smart thing, but whoever takes over inherits a country needing major shifts in economic and foreign policy that they will not make. The arithmetic has already reversed: the last Bundestag election's CDU 28% against AfD 20% is now CDU down to 21%, possibly below 20, against an AfD polling 28% and very likely to go above 30. Christoforou probes the maximum cosmetic package a new leader could offer — deal with immigration, stop the money to Zelensky, while still hating Russia, still pouring money into NATO and Rheinmetall. Mercouris's answer: it doesn't address the core problem. For most Germans the CDU is now the party that embraced mass immigration — Merkel in 2015 basically invited people from Syria and the Middle East, started the whole thing, did it on purpose — and you cannot go back in time and blame it all on Merkel. Nor will the party loosen its link to Brussels and the EU: no cheap Russian energy, still committed to the arms buildup, debt still piling up. What is on offer is Merz's policies slightly diluted, without Merz. The prediction: a more personable, more amiable, less arrogant successor; a bump in support for a few months; then an even faster fall as Germany sees the CDU has no real answers — which by the way is also true. The parallel is Britain: exactly the Labour trajectory, remove the arrogant, aloof, complacent figure (Starmer, now out of Parliament and actively pursuing election as NATO Secretary General), bring in the more engaging Andy Burnham, change nothing, watch the public drift away again — to Reform there, to the AfD here. The radical alternatives fail too: the SPD, dying in its former heartlands, banks increasingly on banning the AfD, but every AfD win makes that harder; and the smear route has visibly backfired — in Mercouris's own view the timing of the Leipzig drone incident was partly intended to damage the AfD, and the we-can't-share-intelligence-because-they're-controlled-by-Moscow line increased AfD support, exactly the opposite of what Berlin hoped. The verdict: the establishment limps along, rotating chancellors, changing nothing of substance, fingers crossed for a political crisis in Moscow — Christoforou's sark: the UK method. The closing question returns to Alice Weidel: Orbán or Meloni — does she stand firm on her policies under Europe's globalist pressure, or fold like Meloni folded and become a good law-abiding globalist? Mercouris first grants the caveat their German viewers regularly write in with: the AfD isn't as radical as it appears — its program against the CDU's doesn't differ that much, it is also a neoliberal party supporting much of the neoliberal consensus, and its politicians are politicians. But two things do distinguish it: a much more radical, harder immigration line than any other party — and a different Russia line altogether: end the conflict, get Russian gas moving west to Germany again, undertake some kind of rapprochement. Not an easy position to hold these past years, but they stuck with it, and it is now paying electoral dividends as more and more Germans understand what a disastrous thing cutting off all that gas was. The payoff argument: the anti-Russian war policies associated with Merz are so unpopular that an AfD government reversing them would be cutting with the political grain — popular, electorally successful — something a German government could probably pull off alone in Europe. And the last marker: Weidel's AfD is now talking about quitting the euro — whether they would is another question, but at least they are talking about it. Who else in Germany is?

1. The headline reading: the AfD outpaced even the most optimistic polls — most capped it at 43%, it got almost 44 — on record turnout above 77%, a tidal wave in regional terms; and the mirror image is a total collapse of Merz's CDU, from about 36% in 2021 to just over 17%, its vote more than halved.

2. The where matters: this is the conservative south of the former East Germany — Kohl's reunification party's natural territory — so the crash is a repudiation of Merz, his Berlin government and the entire German political system, not a local anomaly.

3. The structural claim: this result is the moment Germany's firewall — never coalition with the AfD — is tested to destruction, because the AfD has been delivered the perfect result: just short of a majority, with more than twice the CDU's votes.

4. The stitch-up arithmetic: applying the firewall hands government to a broken, discredited CDU in coalition with far-left heirs of the former ruling communist party — which would be seen across Germany as a grotesque establishment stitch-up and an inversion of democracy.

5. The optimal-result paradox: denied power, the AfD stays the never-tested underdog fighting a corrupt establishment and gains support; given power, the firewall has simply collapsed — either outcome serves the party.

6. The Merz end-game: hostility to him specifically is now so strong — including inside the CDU, where he is seen as arrogant, aloof and out of touch — that with a fifth of Germans already not expecting him to last the year, there is a very high chance of the end of Merz within weeks, against the German norm that let even Scholz limp on.

7. The reset-futility case: the CDU will not break with Merkel's 2015 immigration legacy, will not loosen the Brussels link — so no cheap Russian energy, the arms buildup and the debt continue — leaving nothing on offer but Merz's policies slightly diluted, without Merz.

8. The predicted trajectory: a more personable, less arrogant successor, a bump for a few months, then an even faster fall as Germany sees the CDU has no real answers — exactly the Starmer-to-Burnham trajectory in Britain, where changing the man and changing nothing already played out.

9. The smear dead end: the Leipzig drone timing (partly intended to damage the AfD, in Mercouris's view) and the controlled-by-Moscow intelligence line had exactly the opposite effect to what Berlin hoped — every AfD win makes the ban-the-AfD route the dying SPD is banking on harder too.

10. The two real distinctions: a much harder immigration line than any other party, and a different Russia line — end the conflict, gas moving west again, rapprochement — a costly position the AfD stuck with that is now paying electoral dividends as Germans reckon the gas cutoff a disaster.

11. The payoff argument: Merz's war policies are so unpopular that an AfD government reversing them would cut with the political grain — popular and electorally successful — something a German government could probably pull off alone in Europe; and the party is now talking about quitting the euro.

• Q

  What does the AfD's Saxony-Anhalt landslide actually mean?

  Alex Christoforou asked00:00
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  A tidal wave: the AfD outpaced even the most optimistic polls — most estimates put them at 43 percent at most; they got almost 44 — on a record turnout of over 77 percent. Saxony-Anhalt is no economic powerhouse — around 2 million people — but it is the conservative south of the former East Germany, the CDU's natural territory as Kohl's party of reunification, where the CDU has crashed from about 36 percent in 2021 to just over 17: a massive repudiation of Merz and of the entire German political system. The result is the firewall's destruction test: the AfD fell three seats short of a majority only because Die Linke — the legacy party of the former East German ruling communists — the Greens and the BSW all cleared the threshold. Applying the firewall would hand government to a broken, discredited CDU in coalition with far-left heirs of the former ruling party — a grotesque establishment stitch-up: an inversion of democracy. That is close to the optimal result for the AfD — never tested in government, still the underdog — and with twice the CDU's votes they may yet form one. Inside the CDU the anti-Merz faction is strengthening; about a fifth of Germans no longer expect him to be chancellor beyond the end of the year.

• Q

  Can the CDU do anything — beyond dumping Merz — to stop the bleeding?

  Alex Christoforou asked13:43
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  Getting rid of Merz buys almost nothing: whoever takes over inherits a country that needs major shifts in economic and foreign policy, shifts they will not make. The arithmetic has reversed since the last Bundestag election: the CDU's 28 percent against the AfD's 20 has become CDU 21 percent against an AfD polling 28 and very likely to go above 30. The cosmetic route — we'll deal with immigration, we'll stop the money to Zelensky, we still hate Russia, we'll still pour money into NATO and Rheinmetall — doesn't address the core problem. For most Germans the CDU is now the party of Merkel's 2015 mass immigration; it will not loosen the link to Brussels, so no cheap Russian energy, no letup in the arms buildup, debt still piling up — Merz's policies slightly diluted, without Merz. Expect instead a more personable, less arrogant successor, a few months of recovery, then an even faster fall as Germany sees the CDU has no real answers — exactly the Starmer-to-Burnham trajectory in Britain. Meanwhile the SPD, dying in its former heartlands, banks increasingly on banning the AfD — harder with every AfD win — and the Leipzig-drone smearing before this election backfired. Most likely: the establishment limps along, rotating chancellors, changing nothing, hoping for a crisis in Moscow.

• Q

  Is Alice Weidel an Orbán or a Meloni — would an AfD government stand firm or fold?

  Alex Christoforou asked24:53
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  Caveat first, from German viewers: the AfD is not as radical as it appears — compare its program with the CDU's and there are not that many differences; it is also a neoliberal party supporting much of the neoliberal consensus, and its politicians are politicians. But two distinctions are real. On immigration it takes a much more radical, harder line than any other party. And on Russia it takes a different line altogether: end the conflict, get Russian gas moving west to Germany again, undertake some kind of rapprochement — a hard, costly position they have stuck with for years, which is now paying electoral dividends as more and more Germans understand what a disaster cutting off all that gas was. That matters because Merz's anti-Russian war policies are so unpopular with the German people that an AfD government reversing them would cut with the political grain — popular, electorally successful — something a German government could probably pull off alone in Europe. And Alice Weidel's AfD is now talking about quitting the euro — whether they would is another question, but at least they are talking about it. Who else in Germany is?