Armenia Ditches Russia for the EU and Azerbaijan

In a short take, the hosts take up Pashinyan's stated intention to take Armenia into the European Union — and to break from Russia, including the CSTO security umbrella, shifting toward Europe, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Both call it insanity; Mercouris finds it typical of a certain type of politician in the former Soviet space. Pashinyan, he argues, does have support in Yerevan — NGO-linked figures and a large section of the media — and though Mercouris doubts the official parliamentary-election figures, Pashinyan still controls the parliament. He has already lost Nagorno-Karabakh; what he is jeopardizing now is Armenia's long-term security — which in Mercouris's telling only Russia has provided since the late 18th century, as the Russian Empire's collapse at the end of the First World War starkly showed — and the Russian trade links behind the economy's decent 5-10 years, themselves the reason life stayed okay and Pashinyan stayed in power. The Russians are already restricting Armenian exports and hold the gas lever; cut off, Armenia would have to turn to enemy Azerbaijan, certain — in his opinion — to demand further concessions over Nakhchivan and land corridors. A policy of national suicide, by a man now too committed to change course. Christoforou adds the shape of the ending he expects: Armenia reduced to a type of city-state — Yerevan and its outskirts. The 'very sinister move', as he tells it, was Pashinyan's public concession that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijan's, followed by blame shifted onto Russia and the CSTO — fuel for anti-Russian sentiment and justification for the Western pivot, with Azerbaijani gas to come at a very heavy price and a Western-EU bailout of the economy that 'we know what that means'. Mercouris's rejoinder: there is no economic lifeline from the West — that is fantasy — and no security either; ask the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis, and the Ukrainians what Western guarantees are worth. The decisive fact, as he reads it, is that the Karabakh concession was made before the 2020 war: from that moment Armenia was on the slide, with no point of return. He sees the church appalled and in conflict with Pashinyan — the Catholicos given no role at the opening of parliament — and a man determined to pursue the pro-EU policy to the bitterest end, bitter for the Armenian people. The closing exchange is about how Pashinyan survives at all: Christoforou, a many-time visitor to Yerevan, has never met one person there who likes him — the answer the hosts offer is the NGOs, the media, a US Embassy in Yerevan that is 'a city in itself', and big, powerful diasporas in Russia, France and the United States.

1. Pashinyan has stated he intends to take Armenia into the EU and to break from Russia and the CSTO security umbrella, shifting toward the West, Azerbaijan and Turkey — which the hosts immediately read as insanity.

2. The pivot jeopardizes the security only Russia has provided since the late 18th century — the First World War collapse showed what happens without it — and the Russian trade links behind Armenia's tolerable recent years, which are what kept Pashinyan in power.

3. The levers are already moving: Russian restrictions on Armenian exports, gas supply as the next one — and if gas is cut, Armenia's only alternative is enemy Azerbaijan, certain to demand further concessions over Nakhchivan and land corridors.

4. There is no economic lifeline for Armenia from the West and no security either — the proof being what Western security guarantees delivered for the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis, and the Ukrainians.

5. The point of no return was Pashinyan's recognition — made before the 2020 war — that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan; from that moment Armenia was on the slide, and he is now in conflict with an appalled church, pursuing the pro-EU policy to the bitterest end.

6. How he survives: the NGOs, the media, a US Embassy in Yerevan that is a city in itself, and big, powerful diasporas in Russia, France and the United States — not, in the host's many visits, any Yerevan resident he has met who likes him.

• Q

  Why do the hosts call Pashinyan's pivot to the EU a policy of national suicide?

  Alex Christoforou asked00:03
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  Insanity, in Mercouris's view, but typical of the kind found among a certain type of politician in the former Soviet space. Pashinyan does have support in Yerevan: people linked to the NGOs and a large section of Armenian media back this line, and although Mercouris doubts he did nearly as well as the official figures claim in the recent parliamentary elections, he still controls the parliament. He has already lost Nagorno-Karabakh, and he is now putting Armenia's long-term security — provided, in Mercouris's telling, only by Russia since the late 18th century, as the end of the First World War showed starkly — in jeopardy. More immediately he is jeopardizing the Russia-Armenia economic and trade links behind the country's decent performance of the past five to ten years, which kept life tolerable and Pashinyan in power. The Russians have begun restricting Armenian exports and hold further levers, notably gas. If gas is cut, Armenia has no alternative but its enemy Azerbaijan, which still holds territorial claims and, given its leadership, is certain to use the opening to demand further concessions over Nakhchivan and land corridors. A policy of national suicide — but Pashinyan is now too compromised and too committed to ever change course.

• Q

  Did Pashinyan's Karabakh concession put Armenia past the point of return?

  Alex Christoforou asked04:24
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  No. In Mercouris's account there is no economic lifeline for Armenia from the West — thinking otherwise is fantasy — and no security either: look at what Western security guarantees have delivered for the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis, and the Ukrainians. Pashinyan and people like him in Yerevan are now so deeply committed that retreat is impossible. The decisive step, as Mercouris reads it, was Pashinyan's statement — made before the 2020 war — that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan: from the moment he said it, Armenia was placed on the slide, and from that point there is no return. He is now in conflict with the church, which is appalled: he gave the Catholicos no role in the opening of the Armenian parliament — an astonishing thing — and Mercouris reads him as determined to pursue the pro-Western, pro-EU policy to the bitterest end. And it will be bitter, he says, for the Armenian people.