Peak drone warfare. Putin's next terms and Zelensky's Kiev panic
Executive Summary
Alex Christoforou and Alexander Mercouris assess Ukraine after the three-day Victory Day ceasefire. Both reject the stalemate narrative: Russian drone and missile strikes are far larger and more sophisticated than Ukraine's, and Ukrainian air defenses are badly depleted, with falling interception rates that Kyiv itself now acknowledges. Mercouris reports the sacking of Russian Aerospace Forces chief Afzalov after the Tuapse strike, calls the CIA-supported Ukrainian drone offensive a strategic waste of resources, and cites Responsible Statecraft on a recruitment crisis now met with the most ruthless street round-ups yet and growing counter-violence against recruiters. On the front he sees a breakthrough forming in Zaporozhye toward Orekhov, a gradual collapse in Konstantinovka and Sloviansk worsening — the Battle of Donbas, he says, is coming to an end. Answering Christoforou, Mercouris judges it perfectly reasonable that Russia completes the Donbas operation by autumn, or conservatively by the end of 2026: each captured city isolates the rest — a domino pattern — and Russian offensives follow their seasonal rhythm of spring starts, summer acceleration and late-summer falls, as in 2024 and 2025. The Financial Times, citing two people it says have knowledge of Putin's views, reports that commanders have convinced Putin they can take all of Donbas by autumn and that further demands could include Kiev and Odessa; the hosts clarify that this framing belongs to the FT's European and Ukrainian sources, and Mercouris doubts the paper has access to Putin's circle. Mercouris predicts the post-Donbas Russian terms: Ukrainian withdrawal from Zaporozhye and Kherson and possibly other border areas, commitments to join neither NATO nor the EU, federalization, and the departure of Zelensky and his elite in favor of an interim government including exiled opposition figures such as Tsaryov — terms he expects Kyiv to reject, making the Russian offer in practice an ultimatum, after which the war continues toward Odessa and possibly Kiev, with the Sumy and Kharkiv operations and rumored Belarus build-up as possible preparation. Christoforou closes on the stakes: losing Odessa would be a crisis for Ukraine, but losing Kiev would be a crisis for the leadership itself, which without Kiev could no longer claim to govern Ukraine — a city many in Russia regard as the first Russian city. All front-line claims and predictions are attributed to the speakers; only the two explicitly cited media reports were identified and verified.
Chapters & Key Takeaways
Putin's Terms After Donbas: Ultimatum, Odessa, and the Question of Kiev
What terms will Russia impose once the Battle of Donbas ends, and why do the hosts expect an ultimatum rather than an offer?
No Stalemate After the Ceasefire
When the three-day Victory Day ceasefire ended, Alex Christoforou and Alexander Mercouris returned to the judgment they have held for months: this war is not stuck. Christoforou opens with the interception rates: Ukraine's air defenses, he says, are badly depleted — something even Ukraine now acknowledges. Alex Christoforou 00:28 “one thing is clear, Ukraine's air defenses are badly depleted. You can tell by the interception rates of the Russian missiles and drones, which even Ukraine now is acknowledging” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 00:28
That reading has now reached the mainstream press. A May 13 Financial Times report, citing two people it says have knowledge of Putin's views, says Russian commanders have convinced Putin that his forces could seize the whole of Donbas by autumn, and discusses further demands that could include Kiev and Odessa. Financial Times Corroborates Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy cool on US-led peace talks Verified Media Report Read Source Article For the hosts, this is confirmation rather than news. Donbas, Christoforou says, is the main battle — and once it is concluded, Russia and Putin will come out with new terms to the West. Alex Christoforou 01:09 “The Russian military can take Donbas, and then they're going to issue uh new terms to Ukraine. Something that we've been saying Yeah. for a while now, you brought it up, that's that most likely you would be looking at Donbas, which is the main battle. That would be the battle that's going to get that's going to be concluded, and once that's concluded uh Russia and Putin will will come out with new terms to to the West.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 01:09
An Asymmetric Air War
Mercouris starts with Ukraine's drone campaign into Russia, which he concedes has been an embarrassment for Putin: the head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, a man called Afzalov, has reportedly been sacked, and the word is that this was about the Tuapse affair. Alexander Mercouris 01:53 “this information that the head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, a man called Afzalov, has been sacked. The word, by the way, is that this is about the Tuapse affair. That the thing that provoked his sacking was the Tuapse episode.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 01:53 But repeating a point the hosts have made many times, he insists the strikes will not change the war: damaging as they can be, they are not going to change the direction of the war, affect the Russian economy, or cause a political crisis in Russia. Alexander Mercouris 02:29 “are not going to ultimately change the direction of the war or affect the state of the Russian economy or cause a political crisis in Russia or do any of these things.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 02:29 He goes further and calls the operation a misuse of resources: Ukraine and the CIA — which he says is basically running the operation — are expending resources on an air offensive that achieves very little, resources that might have been better spent on drone defenses for the front lines. Alexander Mercouris 02:56 “they are a mistake. Ukraine and the CIA, which is basically running this operation, are expending resources on this air offensive against Russia, which in objective terms is achieving very little. Resources which might have been more effectively spent doing other things, such as, perhaps, developing more drone defenses for the Ukrainian military on the front lines.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 02:56
The Russian attacks on Ukraine, by contrast, are in his description on a far bigger scale, far more powerful and far more organized, using many types of sophisticated drones — some controlled by air controllers back in Moscow, others jet-powered, some carrying interceptors, some bombs. Alexander Mercouris 03:37 “the drone attacks and the missile attacks, are on a far bigger scale. And they are far more powerful. And they are far more organized. And they use now many different types of very sophisticated drones. Drones that um some of them can be controlled by air controllers back in Moscow, others which are jet-powered, some of which carry interceptors, some of which carry bombs.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 03:37 Hundreds of drones now arrive every night, and in daylight too, and across much of Ukraine, he says, air defenses no longer exist. Alexander Mercouris 04:24 “We have hundreds of drones every night. And now also in daylight, the Ukrainian defenses are indeed very depleted. Apparently, I mean, in across much of Ukraine, they don't exist anymore.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 04:24 The squeeze shows up behind the front lines as well: he cites information about fuel shortages for the military on the front lines, and reports that the personnel crisis is now worse than it has ever been. Alexander Mercouris 05:16 “we we have information about uh fuel shortages, fuel shortages for the military on the front lines. And all of this is compounding further problems with um more reports now that the personnel crisis, the um shortage of soldiers, is now worse than it's ever been.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 05:16
The Recruitment Crisis Turns Violent
Mercouris pairs the air war with the home front, drawing on an article he was reading in Responsible Statecraft. Ukraine's recruitment crisis, now about two years old, has moved from seizing men in the streets and bundling them into vans to, he says, the most ruthless and extreme levels yet — with counter-violence spreading: shooting incidents against recruiters, and boys attacking recruiters with knives. Alexander Mercouris 05:56 “We've had people going out into the streets, seizing men in the streets, bundling them into vans and sending them to the front lines. Well, that has apparently now reached the most um ruthless and extreme levels that we've seen up to now. And there there is now counter violence against it and it's becoming more extensive. There's been shooting incidents against recruiters. There's been incidents where um boys have attacked recruiters with knives, things of that kind. This is all in from this article in Responsible Statecraft.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 05:56 Responsible Statecraft, in a May 13 report, documented men being snatched from streets and homes by sometimes masked men and dragged into minivans, along with shooting incidents and knife attacks by teenagers against recruitment officers. Responsible Statecraft Corroborates Ukraine's conscription crisis is getting increasingly bloody Verified Media Report Read Source Article
The same article, he notes, made a broader observation about the war's information cycles: throughout the war, the West has had brief periods of euphoria — Ukraine is winning, the front lines are stabilizing, there is a stalemate, the Russians are stalled — and the latest such wave is now coming to an end. Alexander Mercouris 08:59 “responsible statecraft article said that throughout the war we have these brief periods of euphoria in the West. Ukraine is winning. The situation on the front lines is stabilizing. We have a stalemate. The Russians are stalled.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 08:59
Donbas by the End of the Year
On the front itself, Mercouris says, there is no stalemate. After the brief Victory Day ceasefire ended, the Russians are very much on the attack — apparently on the brink of breaking through in Zaporozhye towards Orekhov, the key town before the city of Zaporozhye itself, with Ukrainian defenses in Konstantinovka gradually collapsing and Sloviansk getting worse and worse. Alexander Mercouris 08:06 “the Russians now are very much on the attack. They apparently are on the brink of breaking through in Zaporozhye towards Orekhov which is the key town before the city of Zaporozhye itself. There's apparently now a gradual collapse of Ukrainian defenses in the town of Konstantinovka. In Sloviansk things are getting worse and worse.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 08:06 It is clear, he says, despite all the denials and pretenses, that the Battle of Donbas is coming to an end. Alexander Mercouris 08:36 “It's clear that the Battle of Donbas is coming to an end. Despite you know all these denials and all these pretenses that it isn't.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 08:36
Asked whether Russia can complete the Donbas operation by autumn, or by the end of 2026, he does not hesitate: it sounds perfectly reasonable, based on what is happening on the front lines at the moment. Alexander Mercouris 09:39 “I think it sounds perfectly reasonable based on what we're seeing on the front lines at the moment.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 09:39 The mechanism is acceleration. The more cities fall, the faster and easier it becomes to capture the remaining ones — after Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka is taking rather less time, and once it falls, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka begin to look isolated as supply lines become more difficult, until it starts to become like a row of dominoes. Alexander Mercouris 09:49 “the more cities fall, the faster it and easier it becomes to capture the remaining ones. So, if Pokrovsk fell, then after Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka fell. It took time to take Pokrovsk. It's taking apparently rather less time to take Kostyantynivka. But then once you've taken Kostyantynivka, the remaining places, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, begin to look isolated. The supply lines become more difficult to these places. So, it starts to become like a row of dominoes. When one falls, it leads to the fall of the other. And the process gradually accelerates.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 09:49 Russian offensives, he says, follow a seasonal pattern — starting gradually in April and May, building momentum, accelerating rapidly through the summer, with places falling in late summer and early autumn, as in 2024 and 2025. Alexander Mercouris 10:44 “the pattern of Russian offensives is that they start in the spring, in April, May. They start gradually. They gradually build up momentum. Then, during the summer months, we get a rapid acceleration. And then, in the late summer, early autumn, you start to see places fall. This was the pattern in 2024. It was the pattern in 2025.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 10:44 What is left to fall is the key remaining cities of Donbas, because in Donbas there is nothing else — and for a date, he is deliberately conservative: autumn, well, "let's say the end of the year to be more conservative." Alexander Mercouris 11:25 “they're going to fall is the key remaining cities in Donbas. Because in Donbas, there isn't any more anything else. Now, autumn, well, let's say the end of the year to be more conservative.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 11:25
Terms, Ultimatum, and the Kiev Question
The Financial Times article spoke about Kiev and Odessa — that Putin is going to actually demand Kiev itself, even more important to him than Odessa. Mercouris relays that framing without endorsing it: he does not himself think that is what Putin is going to do. Alexander Mercouris 11:57 “that Financial Times article um spoke about Kiev and Odessa. That Putin is going to actually demand Kiev itself. That this is even more important for him than Odessa. Is taking Kiev. I don't myself think that is what Putin is going to do. I don't think that's what the Russians are going to do.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 11:57 His own list of terms starts with territory and alliances: Ukraine must withdraw from Zaporozhye and Kherson and from other areas of that kind, perhaps along the border, and must finally commit not to join NATO — and, he thinks, not to join the EU. Alexander Mercouris 12:28 “Ukraine must withdraw from Zaporozhye and Kherson. There must also be a withdrawal um from other areas that are you know, Russian things of that kind. So, you know, from places maybe along the border and things of that kind. Obviously, they're going to insist that Ukraine finally commit not to join NATO. I think they will also demand that Ukraine commit not to join the EU.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 12:28 The big demand, in his view, is political: a complete reconstruction of Ukraine's political system, with the time having come, he suggests, to move towards federalization. Alexander Mercouris 13:04 “I think the big thing that they're going to demand is that they're going to want a complete reconstruction of the political system in Ukraine. Um You've mentioned federalization in the past. I think they're going to say the time has come to move towards federalization.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 13:04
And it reaches the top of the state. Zelensky himself and the elite around him will have to step down — Russia has said many times it does not accept him as the legitimate leader of Ukraine — with a new interim government including people from the opposition, like Tsaryov, currently in Russia, and others from the former opposition parties now in exile there. Alexander Mercouris 13:26 “and the elite around him step down. They've already said many times that they don't accept him as the legitimate leader of Ukraine. They're going to say that there should be a new interim government created. They're going to demand that some of the people who [snorts] make up that interim government should be people from the opposition, people like uh um uh Tsaryov, who's currently in Russia. Other people like people from the former uh opposition parties who are also now in exile in Russia.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 13:26 Since none of that will be acceptable to Zelensky, what Russia tables will not really be an offer: it will be more an ultimatum, actually, and then the war will continue, followed by an operation towards Odessa. Alexander Mercouris 14:07 “all of that is going to be unacceptable to Zelensky. He's not going to agree to it. And then the offer from the Russians will not be exactly an offer. It will be more an ultimatum, actually. And then the war will continue. And then we will see an operation towards Odessa.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 14:07
Whether there is also an operation towards Kiev, he is less sure of — but the pieces could be argued to be being put into place. The strange operations in Sumy and the Kharkiv region begin to look like preparations for an advance on Kiev, and there have been many rumors of a build-up of logistics and transport links in Belarus, perhaps for an advance towards Kiev from Belarus, as in 2022. Alexander Mercouris 14:38 “you could argue that the pieces are being put into place to do it. So, all of these really strange operations in Sumy and Kharkiv region, they do begin to look like they're preparations for an advance on Kiev. And there's been lots of rumors of some kind of a build-up um of logistics, transport links, and that kind of thing in Belarus, perhaps for an advance towards Kiev from Belarus, as we saw in 2022.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 14:38 If it comes, it will not be a replay: not 2,000 men turning up to capture an airport with another 20,000 behind them, but an army of hundreds of thousands of battle-tested men, with far more armored vehicles and fleets of drones. Alexander Mercouris 15:18 “it will not be 2,000 men turning up and trying to capture an airport with another 20,000 following behind them. It's going to be an army of hundreds of thousands of men, battle-tested, battle-trained, far more armored vehicles, fleets of drones. It will be a completely different operation from the one we saw in 2022.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 15:18
For the Ukrainian leadership, Christoforou argues, Kiev is the scarier prize. Losing Odessa would be a crisis for Ukraine; losing Kiev would be a crisis for them, because without Kiev it becomes much more difficult for them to say they are the government of Ukraine anymore — and Ukraine may realistically never get it back. Alex Christoforou 15:49 “If they lose Odessa, it's a crisis for Ukraine. But if they lose Kiev, it's not just a crisis for Ukraine, it's a crisis for them. Because without Kiev, it becomes much more difficult for them to say that they are the government of Ukraine anymore. Also, the other thing to say is if they lose Kiev, Ukraine realistically may never get it back.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 15:49 The city also carries a historical charge in Russia: many people there consider Kiev not just a Russian city but the first Russian city, the city where Russia as a state and a nation began — not everyone thinks that way, he stresses, but he suspects quite a lot of people in Putin's entourage do. Alex Christoforou 16:17 “it's also considered by many people in Russia not just a Russian city, but the first Russian city, the city where Russia as a state and a nation began. Uh so, I'm not saying everybody in Russia thinks that way, but a lot of people do. And I suspect quite a lot of people in Putin's entourage do.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 16:17
The hosts close with a caveat about provenance. The Financial Times article's sources were European and, Christoforou believes, a Ukrainian source — and it was those sources, not the hosts, talking about Kiev and Odessa. Alex Christoforou 16:52 “the sources for the Financial Times article were European sources and I believe a Ukrainian source, right? Yes, but they did also say >> about Just to be clear, they're the ones talking about Kiev and Odessa.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 16:52 The FT did say it had spoken to two people with knowledge of Putin's views, Mercouris notes, but he does not believe the Financial Times has access to people like that — at least not in Russia. Alexander Mercouris 17:24 “The Financial Times did say that they'd spoken to two people who had knowledge of Putin's views. I don't believe the Financial Times has access to people like that, just the same. At least [snorts] not in Russia.” Direct Audio Anchor Listen from 17:24
Everything in this episode — the front-line readings, the terms, the timelines — is the hosts' attributed interpretation. Whether Donbas falls by the end of the year, and whether any Russian terms arrive as an ultimatum, are predictions the coming months will test.
Interview Highlights2 exchanges
Direct dialogue & timestamps from the recording
Does Mercouris think Russia could complete the Donbas operation by the end of 2026?
Mercouris says completing operations in the Donbas by the end of 2026 is a reasonable estimate based on current front-line developments. He argues that each captured city makes the remaining positions more isolated and their supply lines harder to sustain, creating an accelerating domino effect. He also points to the pattern of Russian offensives in 2024 and 2025: gradual movement in spring, faster advances in summer, and cities falling in late summer or early autumn. On that basis, he expects the remaining key Donbas cities to fall by autumn, or by year-end under a more conservative estimate.
What terms does Mercouris expect Russia to demand after the Donbas operation?
Mercouris does not expect Russia to demand Kyiv itself. He expects demands for Ukrainian withdrawal from Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and possibly other border areas, firm commitments not to join NATO or the EU, and a reconstruction of Ukraine's political system through federalization. He also expects Russia to demand that Zelensky and his inner circle step down and that an interim government include opposition figures, including some now in exile in Russia. Because Zelensky is unlikely to accept those conditions, Mercouris says the proposal would function as an ultimatum and the war would continue, probably toward Odessa; he remains uncertain about a future operation against Kyiv.