U.S. Carrot and Stick Strategy to Save Ukraine

A host-only Duran episode broadcast September 8, 2026, two days after the Kremlin confirmed Putin's three-hours-ten-minutes meeting with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and the envoys' onward leg to Kiev. Christoforou's opener sets the scorn: a complete clown show — Zelensky turning the Kiev meeting into a movie-promotional press tour, saying no compromises, no withdrawal from Donbas, give me Patriots, give me money, give me weapons. Mercouris's verdict on the diplomacy question: it wasn't diplomacy at all. Witkoff and Kushner are friends of the president, not diplomats; diplomacy is a skilled, complex operation needing discretion, care, attention to detail and small steps. The context that explains the trip: over the summer the war took a catastrophic turn for Ukraine — Black Sea coast cut off, landlocked, the economy imploding (about 60 billion by end-2026 in the hosts' backchannel), out of air defenses, pounded day and night, the Russian army advancing everywhere and purposefully, with Donbas possibly falling within weeks or months — some say by January-February 2027. Washington does not want that debacle on its hands, so it is trying to find some means to get the Russians to stop. The anatomy of the attempt is the first segment's core. First the stick: CIA Director Ratcliffe went to Moscow to play the hard man — the situation will get much worse for you unless you do a deal now — and it failed and apparently backfired: Putin and Lavrov refused to meet him, US media report the Russians reacted badly to the threats and escalated as soon as he left. Then the carrot: the sanctions czar brought along, the glittering business opportunities, Bessent telling the Russian finance minister Siluanov at the G20 that sanctions will be lifted once the war ends — the ceasefire, buffer zone, then relief fairy tale. The Russians didn't move. Putin was immensely polite — which irritates many people in Russia — and criticism of Dmitriev is starting to appear in the Russian media itself. And the answer was demonstrated rather than stated: missile and drone strikes on Ukraine while the envoys sat in Moscow, some very close to Boryspil airport; no direct flight to Kiev made possible, so Warsaw and the train — and then Zelensky's no-compromises circus for two men who came empty-handed. Where next? Washington keeps pushing the trilateral meeting — Ratcliffe had suggested one; a Trump call to Putin is in the air — but Putin rejected it again at Bishkek: these people want personal meetings and are threatening us with terrorism at one and the same time. The administration's real problem is that it has nothing else: money for Zelensky is politically toxic, the US has no weapons to spare. And the politeness itself is a trap: the Americans will misread Putin's good wishes to Trump as room to push further — realistically, that is not going to happen. The second segment dissects what the meeting was and what Washington thinks it would get. Trump, on Mercouris's reading, genuinely believes a deal forms in five or ten minutes because he is present in the room. From the Russian point of view the format has two fatal flaws: it legitimizes Zelensky — Putin and Trump are both legitimate presidents, so seating Zelensky alongside accepts him as a legitimate party to negotiations — and it builds a two-against-one squeeze: Trump and Zelensky together demanding a ceasefire, some mechanism to make the Russians stop. The Russians won't stop. Per the Kremlin website as the episode has it, Putin's introductory words read: we're advancing all across the front line, and we are going to win — and Ushakov's summary said the same, his 'the Russians', not just Putin, suggesting military people in the room. Most of the three hours ten minutes was the Russians walking the Americans through the front — over the heads of two men who don't know Kramatorsk from Sloviansk — followed by an informal dinner, possibly sandwiches; Christoforou's jab: they've been doing that through eight meetings with Witkoff now, and they're still not understanding it. Meanwhile Washington is also enlisting Modi, Tokayev and Lula to press Putin — the Europeans nowhere to be seen. The military rundown that follows is the reference map: terrible in every single place. The Russians are storming a village confusingly also called Dobropillia, southwest of the town; if it falls, Dobropillia sits in a cauldron with no access roads — opening the way to encircling Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the south, with the settlements between Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka just captured, another encirclement in the northeastern Kharkiv region that should never have been allowed, and Orekhov in effect encircled and about to fall. A crisis right across the battlefronts — while Witkoff and Kushner probably still believe the Western media's stalemate story; by the time they understand, it will be too late. Donbass will fall. Ratcliffe and the Pentagon understand it — hence the bribes. Folded in, the Zelensky read: his weapons-and-money talk is a man trying to get through this winter to mid-2027; he is preparing his exit within six months to a year. And the closing fact-check: ISW's map and statement that Putin gave the military a directive to capture 15 or 12 settlements within a certain deadline — complete fiction, in the hosts' word, from the Nuland-Kagan family's institute that does this all the time. Putin has never expressed any deadlines in public to anybody anywhere at any time; the pattern runs the other way — the West makes up deadlines, attributes them to Putin, and scores Russia against them. The Russians don't operate that way, and never will.

1. The trip's verdict: it wasn't diplomacy at all — Witkoff and Kushner are friends of the president, not diplomats, and diplomacy needs discretion, care, detail and small steps, none of which this was.

2. The context that forces Washington's hand: over the summer the war took a catastrophic turn — Ukraine landlocked, its economy imploding (about 60 billion by end-2026 in the hosts' crosstalk), out of air defenses, pounded day and night while the Russian army advances everywhere.

3. The stick first: Ratcliffe went to Moscow to play the hard man — things will get much worse unless you deal now — and it failed: Putin and Lavrov refused to meet him, and the Russians reportedly escalated as soon as he left.

4. Then the carrot: the sanctions czar, the glittering business opportunities, Bessent telling Siluanov at the G20 that sanctions will be lifted once the war ends — the ceasefire-buffer-zone-then-relief fairy tale, which the Russians rejected exactly as they rejected the threats.

5. The Russian demonstration: strikes near Boryspil while the envoys were in Moscow, no direct flight to Kiev made possible — Warsaw and the train — and then Zelensky's no-compromises press circus for men who came empty-handed.

6. The Bishkek rejection: these people want personal meetings and are threatening us with terrorism at one and the same time — Putin's latest refusal of the trilateral meeting, which the episode reads as final for this format.

7. The Washington diagnosis: the Trump administration has nothing else — money for Zelensky is politically toxic, the US has no weapons to give — so it keeps pushing meetings that cannot deliver.

8. Why Moscow says no: the meeting legitimizes Zelensky (Putin and Trump are legitimate presidents; seating Zelensky accepts him as a legitimate party) and manufactures a two-against-one ceasefire squeeze — and the Russians won't stop.

9. The meeting's anatomy: most of the three hours ten minutes was the Russians walking the Americans through the front — per Ushakov's summary, 'the Russians', suggesting military in the room — the eighth such attempt to make them understand, with an informal dinner adding little.

10. The front-line cascade: the same-named village southwest of Dobropillia puts the town in a cauldron when it falls — opening the southern encirclement of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, with the Druzhkivka settlements, a new Kharkiv-region encirclement and encircled Orekhov completing a crisis right across the battlefronts.

11. The Zelensky read: his give-me-weapons-and-money talk is a man trying to get through this winter to mid-2027 — preparing his exit within six months to a year, with which Mercouris agrees.

12. The fact-check: Putin has never expressed deadlines publicly anywhere — the West makes them up, attributes them to Putin and scores Russia against them; ISW's settlement-directive story is, in the hosts' word, fiction.

• Q

  What did the Witkoff-Kushner Moscow-Kyiv trip actually achieve?

  Alex Christoforou asked00:00
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  Nothing — because it wasn't diplomacy. Witkoff and Kushner are friends of the president, not diplomats: diplomacy needs discretion, care, attention to detail, small steps. The context is that over the summer the war took a catastrophic turn: Ukraine is landlocked, its economy imploding, out of air defenses, pounded day and night while the Russian army advances everywhere, and Donbas may fall within weeks or months — some say by January-February 2027. Washington wants no debacle in Europe, so it first sent CIA Director Ratcliffe to play the hard man: things will get much worse for you unless you deal now. Putin and Lavrov refused to meet him, and the Russians reportedly reacted badly to the threats and escalated as soon as he left. Then the soft cop with the gifts: the sanctions czar, the glittering business opportunities, Bessent telling the Russian finance minister at the G20 that sanctions will be lifted once the war ends. The Russians rejected the bribes too — kept striking near Boryspil while the envoys were in Moscow, and made them fly to Warsaw and take the train to Kyiv, where Zelensky put them through his no-compromises press circus. As Putin said in Bishkek: they want personal meetings while threatening us with terrorism.

• Q

  Why does Putin keep rejecting the Trump-Zelensky trilateral meeting?

  Alex Christoforou asked07:56
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  Washington is still pushing hard for the Trump-Putin-Zelensky meeting as part of a ceasefire deal, but Putin rejected the idea yet again — this time at his Bishkek press conference: these people want personal meetings and are threatening us with terrorism at one and the same time, so that is not going to go anywhere. The Americans have not given up trying to get the Russians to stop; the Russians are not going to stop, and that is something people in the West need to understand. The Trump administration's real problem is that it has nothing else: giving more money to Zelensky is politically toxic, and the United States has no weapons to give him either. One more risk cuts the other way: Putin was immensely polite to the envoys — as he always is, perhaps even more so than usual — and extended good wishes to Trump. The Americans will misread that and think that because Putin is nice to them in public they can push a little further and move the process on. Realistically, that is not going to happen.

• Q

  What does Washington expect from a Putin-Trump-Zelensky meeting, and why won't Moscow agree to it?

  Alex Christoforou asked10:31
  A

  Alexander Mercouris answered

  Trump probably does expect a deal to form in five or ten minutes just because he is present in the room. From the Russian point of view the meeting has two fatal problems. First, it legitimizes Zelensky: with Putin and Trump both legitimate presidents of their countries, seating Zelensky alongside them amounts to accepting him as a legitimate party to negotiations — one reason the Russians will never agree. Second, it manufactures a two-against-one squeeze: Trump and Zelensky meeting Putin together and demanding a ceasefire — some mechanism to get the Russians to stop. And the Russians won't stop. On the Kremlin website, Putin's introductory words to the envoys read: we are advancing all across the front line, and we are going to win. Ushakov's summary said the same and hinted the military was in the room. Most of the three hours ten minutes was the Russians walking the Americans through the front — which went over the heads of two men who don't know Kramatorsk from Sloviansk. Meanwhile Washington is also enlisting Modi, Tokayev and Lula to press Putin. The Europeans are simply cut out.